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Abstract
This paper has two related objectives. First, it seeks to identify the key
determinants of some policies that have been at the heart of the reforms of
the telecommunications industry in developing countries, namely, liberaliza-
tion, privatization, and the (re)structuring of regulation. Second, it attempts
to estimate the extent to which these policies have translated into actual
deployment of telecommunications infrastructure. This simultaneous inves-
tigation is conducted by means of an econometric analysis of a 1985-1999
time-series-cross-sectional database on 86 developing countries. Sectoral as
well as institutional and financial factors are found to be important determi-
nants of the actual reforms implemented. We uncover a positive relationship
between the decision to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment
and the growth of the fixed-line segment, suggesting that these two segments
have benefited from each other. We also find that countries facing increas-
ing institutional risk and financial constraints are more likely to introduce
competition in the digital cellular segment and to privatize the fixed-line in-
cumbent, these policies being economically attractive to both investors and
governments. In turn, these policies are those that enhance the deployment
of fixed-line infrastructure. In contrast, competition in the analogue cellular
segment and the creation of a separate regulator seem to be relatively less
attractive policies as they are found to be less likely to be introduced in coun-
tries facing increasing institutional risk and budget constraints. Their impact
on fixed network deployment is found to be negative or non significant.
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1 Introduction
The telecommunications sector has been at the forefront of the wave of re-
forms that has profoundly reshaped infrastructure industries worldwide by
allowing new market configurations and institutions to emerge. Both devel-
oped and developing countries have been concerned with enhancing industry
suppliers’ performance. Competition in some segments of the industry has
been introduced, sometimes with (some level of) privatization of state-owned
incumbents, and the legal and regulatory framework has been (re)designed
with the purpose of enhancing diversification and quality of service, effi-
ciency, and tariffs. However, policy makers in developing countries faced a
far more challenging task than their developed countries counterparts. Poor
infrastructures, weak economic conditions, and inefficient institutions inher-
ited from the pre-reforms era are all but some of the significant impediments
to the advancement of the reforms they had to overcome. Given the scarcity
of resources, the question then is how to efficiently allocate these resources
among the many objectives.
Gasmi et al. (2006) have empirically shown that political accountability
is an important determinant of regulatory performance and argued that poli-
cies aimed at enhancing politically accountable systems should be given due
attention in development programs. In this paper, we further investigate the
relationship between the reforms of the telecommunications sector that have
been implemented in developing countries and the evolution of this sector.
We approach this issue by attempting to both evaluate the impact of the
sectoral reforms on the deployment of infrastructure and identify the main
factors that led to the implementation of some specific reforms.
In addition to insufficient deployment of telecommunications technolo-
gies and lack of good institutional governance, developing countries are often
characterized by poor macroeconomic conditions. The structuration of the
reforms in terms of their number, their design, and their timing, as well as
their effective impact on the industry performance, are all subject to these
constraints. Hence, market outcomes resulting from the telecommunications
reforms are not only conditioned by decisions pertaining to the sector it-
self, but also by the institutional and macroeconomic environment. Factors
such as corruption engrained in the political system and lack of democracy
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substantially weaken the efficiency of institutional rules whereas high debt
service and inefficient taxation worsen the financial situation.
While the question of the impact of telecommunications reforms on the
deployment of infrastructure in developing countries has been fairly well ad-
dressed from an empirical standpoint, the issue of the determinants of these
reforms has been mainly examined at a theoretical level.2 This paper con-
tributes to filling this void by tackling these two issues within a unified em-
pirical framework. Using data on the telecommunications industry in devel-
oping countries, we attempt to simultaneously evaluate the impact of the
reforms on network expansion and investigate the role that infrastructure
deployment, institutional risk, and access to public funds have played in
the decisions to introduce competition, privatize the state-owned incumbent
operator, and create a separate regulatory authority. The link between sec-
toral reforms and infrastructure deployment variables is explored by means
of a systematic investigation of two-way causal relationships between these
variables.
Our search for a two-way causality between reform and network expansion
variables also gives us an indication on whether some of our right-hand-side
variables should be considered as endogenous in our regressions. One might
expect, indeed, that policies such as the introduction of competition and
privatization may be endogenous to infrastructure deployment, particularly
in the early stages of the reforms.3 Moreover, the creation of a separate
regulatory entity may also depend on pre-regulatory conditions.
In this paper, we depart from the approach typically followed in the liter-
ature to analyze the telecommunications reforms in developing countries by
treating separately the analogue and digital segments of the cellular market
as far as the the introduction of competition and its impact on fixed network
deployment are concerned. Such a separate treatment is warranted by the
observation that digital is based on a higher capacity and more efficient tech-
nology that allows for a wider range of service offerings.4 Moreover, because
2Fink et al. (2002) provide a comprehensive overview of the empirical stream of the
literature. Theoretical contributions include Auriol and Picard (2004), Emerson (2006),
Evans et al. (2005), Laffont (2005), and Warlters (2004).
3Note that licenses are often granted conditional on the fulfillment of service penetration
and quality targets and associated with exclusivity periods.
4Digital technology allows to connect up to four times more users than analogue with
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analogue and digital licenses are delivered under specific contractual terms
and were granted at different points in history, their impact on the devel-
opment of the telecommunications industry cannot be expected to be the
same.5 In fact, disentangling the contribution of each of these two segments
to the considerable network expansion experienced by developing countries
in recent years is one of the main objectives of this study.6
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section summarizes some
of the main results recently put forward in the empirical literature on the
determinants of the telecommunications reforms and their impact on infras-
tructure deployment as measured by fixed-line service penetration. Section
3 describes the data set used in this paper consisting of information on the
telecommunications industry in 86 developing countries during the period
1985-1999. Section 4 presents our empirical investigation of the determinants
of the telecommunications reforms and their impact on infrastructure deploy-
ment. Section 5 summarizes our findings, discusses some policy implications,
and points to some directions for further research. The appendix contains
some tables that present the estimation results. A detailed description of the
data used, their sources, and some complementary material are included in
a supplemental document available from the authors upon request.
2 Related literature
Thanks to the availability of telecommunications data accumulated over the
last two decades, a large empirical literature has analyzed the impact of major
reforms on infrastructure deployment in this sector. In contrast, the empirical
literature exploring the determinants of these reforms is at its infancy and
the same bandwidth. Moreover, the data transmission capabilities of digital allow the
offering of SMS and some other more advanced services.
5Authorities typically grant operators specific licenses that give them the right to offer
exclusively analogue or digital cellular services. Because of superior technological capa-
bilities, digital has attracted much more operators than analogue. A commonly observed
industry configuration is two to five operators with digital technology and one with ana-
logue. Analogue licenses being introduced prior to digital, they were typically granted to
the fixed service incumbent. Clearly then, one should expect the introduction of digital
and analogue cellular services to have a different effect on the development of the fixed
network.
6Competition between these two segments is however not the focus of this paper.
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mostly deals with political factors. We briefly review some representative
studies in each of these two streams of the literature and point to some
aspects this paper contributes to.
Most of the studies done so far on the impact of sectoral reforms on infras-
tructure deployment in developing countries acknowledge that, overall, there
exists a robust relationship between variables representing the reforms and
variables measuring telecommunications network expansion such as fixed-line
service penetration. In particular, the bulk of this literature has come to the
conclusion that the introduction of competition has resulted in measurable
network deployment and labor efficiency in the fixed-line segment.
Fink et al. (2002) provide an analysis of the impact of competition on
fixed-line deployment and labor efficiency in data on 86 developing countries
across African, Asian, Middle Eastern, Latin American, and Caribbean coun-
tries for the period 1985-1999. Wallsten (2001), Gutierrez (2003), and Ros
(2003) use data on a set of African and Latin American countries while Ros
(1999) uses data on countries with GDP per capita of less than USD 10,000
and McNary (2001) and Li and Xu (2004) use worldwide data. Though
McNary (2001), Fink et al. (2002), and Li and Xu (2004) consider the intro-
duction of competition in the fixed-line and cellular segments, to the best of
our knowledge, the analogue and digital segments have yet to be addressed
separately. This paper is an attempt to do so.
There is not such a consensus on the impact of the privatization of the
fixed-line incumbent on network expansion. Some empirical results indi-
cate that this policy has a positive impact on fixed-line deployment. After
controlling for tariff re-balancing, Banerjee and Ros (2000) find that priva-
tization reduces unmet demand by approximately 28% in a data set on 23
Latin American countries for the period 1986-1995. Gutierrez (2003) reports
a reduction of unmet demand of the order of 10 to 18% in data on 22 Latin
American countries covering the period 1980-1997. Similar results are ob-
tained by Fink et al. (2002), Ros (2003), and Li and Xu (2004) using various
data sets.
Other empirical studies using worldwide data sets, in particular, Ros
(1999) and McNary (2001), indicate that privatization has no or even a neg-
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ative impact on fixed-line deployment.7 Nevertheless, both authors insist
on the role played by independent regulators in the privatization process, a
feature that neither of them includes in their investigations. The importance
of this issue is highlighted by Wallsten (2001) and Gutierrez (2003) who find
that privatization coupled with the existence of an independent regulator
results in larger gains in terms of network expansion. Fink et al. (2002)
and Ros (2003) also find that the impact of privatization and competition
reforms is enhanced by the creation of a separate regulator. As to the impact
of privatization on efficiency, it is found that it is similarly affected by the
presence of an independent regulator (Wallsten, 2001, Gutierrez, 2003).8
There is an emerging yet limited empirical literature focusing on the deter-
minants of sectoral reforms in infrastructure industries and this literature has
been so far mainly concerned with political factors. Using telecommunica-
tions data for the period 1990-1998 on a panel of countries chosen worldwide,
Li and Xu (2002) and Li et al. (2005) explore the political economy of liber-
alization, privatization, and regulatory reforms.9 In both studies, countries
with stronger pro-reform interest groups, namely, financial actors and urban
consumers, are more likely to implement reforms in more democratic environ-
ments. Li and Xu (2002) find that less democratic countries are more likely
to maintain the public sector monopoly when the fiscal deficit is high. In
addition, Li et al. (2005) find that reforms are less likely to be implemented
in countries where incumbent operators have already sunk large investments
since these operators have strong incentives to oppose the reforms.
Closer to our work, Gual and Trillas (2006) are, to the best of our knowl-
edge, the first to consider both the determinants of the reforms, in particular,
to highlight the role of entry and regulatory policies, and the impact of the
7For an analysis of privatization policies across the world, see Bortolotti and Siniscalco
(2004).
8Some details of the private transactions are also found to play an important role
in network deployment. See Wallsten (2000) and Li and Xu (2004) for the effects of
exclusivity periods and Ros (2003) for the effects of the price cap regulatory regime.
9Liberalization reforms are measured by an index computed as the average of six indi-
cators describing the market environment (multiple-player environment, pro-competition
initiatives, and interconnection policy) in the fixed-line and cellular segments. Privatiza-
tion concerns the fixed-line incumbent while regulatory reforms account for tariff policies
and the degree of autonomy and transparency of regulation in the fixed-line and cellular
segments.
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reforms on network deployment. They use a Two-Stage-Least-Squares esti-
mation technique to fit 1998 cross-sectional data on 37 countries.10 Though
their results are not always robust, these authors find some preliminary ev-
idence that competition policies have a positive impact on network deploy-
ment and that regulatory independence has a negative effect on productivity.
With regard to the determinants of reforms, they find that countries with in-
terventionist traditions have fewer liberalization policies and that the larger
the size of the incumbent and the lower the protection of investors, the more
prone a country is to create an independent regulator.
We extent the work of Gual and Trillas (2006) in two ways. First, we
analyze in a more disaggregated manner the role of major policies that have
been used to reform the telecommunications sector. More specifically, we
attempt to estimate the effect of the level of competition in the digital and
analogue cellular segments, and in the local fixed-line segment, the effect of
the creation of a separate regulator, and the effect of privatization of the
fixed-line incumbent. Second, we provide an interpretation of some of our
results as tests of a series of hypotheses derived from the theoretical litera-
ture on telecommunications reform. These hypotheses are mostly concerned
with the institutional and financial endowments of a country that have been
emphasized in the literature as being important drivers of infrastructure in-
dustries reforms in developing countries. This approach allows us therefore
to evaluate the indirect impact, through the reforms selected by the govern-
ments, of these country-specific features on infrastructure deployment.
3 Data
We have constructed a time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) data set contain-
ing time-varying information on 86 developing countries for the period 1985-
10Entry policies relate to investment conditions imposed on entrants, average number of
cellular providers, number portability, carrier selection, carrier pre-selection, and local loop
unbundling availability. Regulatory policies have to do with licensing, interconnection,
tariffs, scarce resources, universal service, the funding structure, the appointment process
of regulators, the length of the term, the reporting process, the year of establishment of
effective operation, and the incumbent capital ownership.
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1999.11 These data have been organized in variables regrouped in five cate-
gories, namely, “Telecommunications deployment,” “Telecommunications re-
forms,” “Institutional environment and risk indices,” “Cost of public funds,”
and “Other variables and instruments.” The list of the countries in four
regions included in the data set, the designation of each of the variables,
the data sources, some standard summary statistics, and some information
on the history of the introduction of analogue and digital cellular technolo-
gies in the country regions are given in the supplemental document available
from the authors upon request. To facilitate the discussion of the various
variables used in the analysis, we give in Table 1 below their acronyms and
designation.
The deployment of telecommunications infrastructure is captured in a
variable that gives the number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants that
connect the subscribers’ terminal equipment to the PSTN.12 Telecommuni-
cations reforms are represented by variables that give the number of com-
petitors in the analogue and digital cellular segments, variables that indicate
whether competition prevails in the fixed-line local segment and whether a
separate telecommunications regulator has been created, and a variable that
gives the % of the fixed-line incumbent’s assets sold to private investors. The
extent of competition in the analogue and digital cellular markets is captured
in a four-category variable that specifies the number of licenses issued in these
segments, that is, no license, one license (monopoly), two licenses (duopoly),
or more (high competition). As to the fixed-line market, we focus on compe-
tition in the local segment as this is the one that has historically constituted
a bottleneck.13 Moreover, we do not differentiate between a duopoly situa-
tion and a high competition situation in the fixed-line local segment since
there are very few countries in our data set that have actually attributed
more than two licenses to this segment.
11Selectivity bias should not be a concern in our data set. First, our panel includes
some countries that have reformed and some that haven’t. Second, firms do not appear
as having control over the regulatory regime under which they operate. On the one
hand, firms with poor performance may be subject to reforms. On the other hand, the
government may decide to reform well performing sectors that deliver high license fees.
For empirical evidence on such a positive relationship between firms’ performance and the
introduction of reforms, see, e.g., Ross (1999).
12Public Switched Telephone Network.
13Hence, we do not consider competition in the long distance and international segments.
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Table 1
List of variables and designation*
Variable Designation
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEPLOYMENT
ml Fixed-line deployment
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORMS
ac Cellular competition (analogue)
counter ana Counter (analogue)
dc Cellular competition (digital)
counter dig Counter (digital)
lc Fixed-line competition (local)
r Separate regulator
p Privatization
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RISK INDICES
corruption Corruption
institutional Institutional index
democracy Democracy index
risk Risk index
COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS
debt Total debt service
tax Net taxes on products
aid Aid per capita
OTHER VARIABLES AND INSTRUMENTS
density Population density
rural Rural population
import Imports
staff Telecommunications staff
checks Checks and balances
english English legal origin
french French legal origin
protest80 Share of protestant (1980)
latitude Latitude
school80 Average schooling years (1980)
ethno Ethnolinguistic fractionalization
africa Africa
land Crop and forest land
polcon Political constraints
free press Free press
ethnic Ethnic tensions
rule Law and order
*A detailed description of these variables is provided in the supplemental document.
The institutional environment and risk indices indicate how corrupt the
government is and how strong its ability to commit to announced policy is.14
14To capture the quality of the institutional environment, we use an index represented
by the variable institutional (see Table 1). The variable institutional is built by sum-
ming five institutionalization variables the values of which are given in the supplemental
document. These variables capture the degree of corruption in the political system, the
quality of the bureaucracy and its capacity to govern without drastic changes in policies
or interruption of service, law and order as a measure of the strength of the legal system
and of the popular observance of the law, the risk of expropriation of private investments
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These indices are constructed from variables measuring the degree of corrup-
tion, the quality of the institutional framework, and the level of democracy
in the country.15 Corruption includes actual and potential influence of the
political system in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reserva-
tions, favors for favors, secret party funding, and close ties between politicians
and businesses. The quality of the institutional framework is captured by a
variable that is calculated as the unweighted sum of variables reflecting gov-
ernment integrity, the efficiency of bureaucracy, the strength of courts and
their capacity to enforce decisions, and government commitment credibility,
in particular, the extent to which asset expropriation and contract repudi-
ation is used by the government. The level of democracy is captured in a
variable whose value is found by subtracting an index of autocracy from an
index of democracy. The risk index is measured by a variable computed as
the average of three series corresponding to economic, financial, and institu-
tional risks. Higher values of these institutional environment and risk indices
reflect a “better” overall institutional environment and a lower risk.
The cost of public funds is captured in variables measuring the value of
debt service and net taxes on products as a proportion of respectively the
gross national income (GNI) and the gross domestic product (GDP) and aid
per capita, all expressed in 2000 USD.16 These variables are chosen because
of the relationships between them which can be explained as follows. For
a given tax system, increases in debt force the government to increase its
revenue requirement by borrowing more or by increasing taxation. Hence,
one can expect a positive relationship between debt and the cost of public
funds.17 Net taxes on products capture a type of commodity taxation which
has been introduced in recent years providing developing countries with a
more effective instrument for raising revenues than other indirect taxation
mechanisms such as taxes on profits. These relatively efficient taxes and aid
by forced nationalization, say, and the risk that the government modifies a contract by
repudiation, postponement, or scaling down. Higher values of this index reflect a better
overall institutional environment.
15Laffont (2005) evokes the idea of corruption and democracy being negatively corre-
lated.
16The cost of public funds is commonly viewed as the deadweight loss due to distor-
tionary taxation that the government has to rely on to collect these funds.
17We should note that here we are not making inferences about the variables in levels.
Indeed, a given level of the cost of public funds results from a complex interaction among
multiple tax instruments and as such it may coexist with different debt levels.
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perceived by the government may have a direct impact on the government
funding requirements and can be expected to be negatively correlated with
the cost of public funds.18 Since it takes time for changes in debt or aid to
have an effect on the tax system and for taxes on products to be settled,
we use lagged values of these variables in the parameterization of the cost of
public funds.
Variables under the heading of “Other variables and instruments” are
those that measure other factors that are deemed relevant for our estimation
of the determinants and the impact of the reforms. The “variables” part
includes the population density, the % of the population that is rural, imports
as a proportion of GDP, full time fixed-line and cellular telecommunications
staff as a proportion of total population, and the number of checks and
balances in the political system. In addition to being an indicator of the
division of power in the political system, in as so far as it is informative
of the political stability of the country, the checks and balances variable
also captures the level of the (social) discount rate in the country. More
specifically, the higher the discount rate, i.e., the higher the valuation of the
future by agents, the higher the number of checks and balances indicating a
“better” mode of functioning of the political process.
The “instruments” part includes a set of variables reflecting various coun-
try specific features that might improve the explanatory power of the esti-
mated models. This set includes variables concerning some aspects related to
the origin (English or French) of the legal system, the importance of protes-
tants in the population (% in 1980), the country’s latitude (in absolute value),
the country’s level of literacy (average schooling years in the population over
25 in 1980), and the ethno-linguistic fractionalization of the country. It also
includes variables that specify whether the country belongs to Sub-Saharan
Africa, the importance of crop and forest land in the country (ratio to total
land), whether there are significant political obstacles to policy changes in
the country, the quality of the media’s legal environment, the degree of ten-
sion attributable to race, nationality, or language, and the strength of the
legal system and the public observance of the law.
18This is a different argument than that of aid conditionality. For example, aid con-
ditionality may not be effective when the recipient country does not want to reform (see
Ghosh Banerjee and Rondinelli, 2003).
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4 Empirical analysis
To empirically investigate the determinants of the telecommunications re-
forms and the impact of these reforms on network expansion, we run a set of
regressions with the dependent variable representing either a reform policy or
a measure of infrastructure deployment. Prior to specifying the regressions
to be estimated, however, we perform some tests for the existence of two-way
causal relationships between the variables representing telecommunications
reforms and those representing fixed-line network deployment.19 These tests,
of the Granger-causality type developed in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), allow
us to obtain a set of potential explanatory variables to be used in the speci-
fication of the regressions.20
In the reform regressions, the independent variables have been chosen so
as to allow us to test some hypotheses derived from the recent theoretical lit-
erature on the determinants of the reforms. These hypotheses are concerned
with the role of corruption and the cost of public funds in the decisions
to introduce competition and privatize state-owned incumbents. They are
also concerned with the influence that the government’s ability to commit,
the return on investment, and the discount factor have on the decision to
create a separate regulator. In the regressions that aim to explain infras-
tructure deployment, the latter being measured by a variable of fixed-line
network expansion, we use, among other explanatory variables, indicators of
the telecommunications reforms.
For the estimation, we apply two different techniques according to the
nature of the dependent variable. For the regressions involving a discrete
dependent variable, we use the group duration methodology developed in
Beck et al. (1998). This is the case when the dependent variable is an
indicator of competition in the analogue or digital cellular segments, in the
local fixed-line segment, or of the existence of a separate regulator. For the
regressions involving a continuous dependent variable, we use the System
19These tests also shed some light on the issue of endogeneity of reforms to network
expansion, an issue that has been raised in the literature. See Ros (1999) and Gutierrez
(2003) on the endogeneity of competition in the local, long distance, and international
fixed-line service, and of the privatization of the incumbent operator. Endogeneity of
regulation is discussed in Gutierrez (2003) and Ros (2003).
20The reader is referred to Gasmi et al. (2006) for details on the implementation of
these tests.
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Generalized Method of Moments (SYS-GMM) developed by Arellano and
Bond (1991) for panel data and applied by Beck and Katz (2004) to TSCS
data.21 This technique is used when the dependent variable represents the
privatization reform policy or the deployment of fixed-line network.
This empirical section is organized as follows. We first describe the basic
econometric equations specified and the methods used to estimate them. Sec-
ond, we present the results of a preliminary inspection of the data the purpose
of which is to search for empirical evidence of causal relationships between
the telecommunications reforms and fixed-line deployment variables. Third,
we discuss the theoretical hypotheses on the determinants of the reforms
that we test in our regressions. Fourth, we move on to presenting the results
of our regressions of the determinants of the reforms. Fifth, we synthesize
the empirical information contained in the results pertaining to the simul-
taneous relationship between reforms and fixed network expansion. Finally,
we summarize our findings on the institutional and economic environment
determinant of reforms.
4.1 Econometric specification and estimation methods
For the regressions in which the reform dependent variables are discrete, we
fit the data by applying a grouped duration methodology that allows us to
explore the presence of temporal dependence.22 This methodology consists
in using the complementary log-log (CLOGLOG) estimation technique with
the discrete dependent variables capturing the elapsed time until the reform
and with d temporal dummies, tempd, d = 1, 2, . . . , 14, capturing the time
since the most recent event.23 Since including the temporal dummies may
introduce multicollinearity, we first test if they are needed by means of a
21See also Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
22The presence of temporal dependence in TSCS discrete regressions results in a viola-
tion of the assumption of independent observations which leads to an underestimation of
their variability. In our context, the number of years elapsed between an event, e.g., the
issuing of a license in the case of competition variables or the creation of the regulatory
authority in the case of the variable that indicates the existence of a separate regulator,
and the start of the sample or the previous event seems likely to influence the results.
23The dependent variable takes on the value 1 in year t if one license or more has been
issued sometime in year t, in the case of the competition variables, or if the regulatory
agency has been separated from and is not directly controlled by a ministry or a utility
sometime in year t, in the case of the variable indicating the existence of a separate
regulator, and 0 otherwise. The temporal dummies are created by first constructing a
variable marking the length of the sequence of zeros that precede the current observation
of the dependent variable.
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likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that the observations are temporally
independent, i.e., that tempd = 0 for all d.
An econometric issue which is particularly relevant in our modeling con-
text is that of the occurrence of multiple events in the series indicating com-
petition in the analogue and digital cellular segments. Omitting to explicitly
model multiple events amounts to assuming that first, second, and subse-
quent events are independently distributed. It is, however, unlikely that an
event such as the issuing of a license is independent of the timing and the
number of licenses previously issued in the same segment. To model multi-
ple events, we include a variable, counter, that counts at a given year the
number of similar events that occurred in the previous years.24
In the case of a discrete reform dependent variable, we then specify the
following model:
r∗it = φ+ x
′
itϕ+
T−1∑
d=1
tempd,it + counterit + ωit (1)
i = 1, 2, . . . , N ; t = 1, 2, . . . , T ; rit =
{
1 if r∗it ≥ 0
0 if r∗it < 0
where the indices i and t refer to the country and the year, respectively, r∗it is
an unobserved latent variable, rit is a dichotomous variable representing the
reform, φ is a scalar parameter, xit is a vector of regressors, ϕ is the associated
vector of parameters, and ωit is a disturbance term. The vector of regressors
xit includes the population density, the % of the population that is rural, and
some variables introduced for the purpose of testing a series of hypotheses
derived from the theoretical literature on the determinants of reforms.25 For
the data set used in the analysis N = 86, the number of developing countries
in the sample, and T = 15, the number of years of observation in the period
1985-1999.
24The counter variable takes on the value 0 in year t if no license has been issued in t−1
or earlier, 1 if one license has been issued in t − 1 or earlier, 2 if two licenses have been
issued in t−1 or earlier, and 3 if three or more licenses have been issued in t−1 or earlier.
In practice, this variable is noted counter ana in the regression concerning competition in
the analogue cellular segment and counter dig in the one concerning competition in the
digital cellular segment.
25The vector of regressors xit is expressed in first differences in order to eliminate sources
of unobserved fixed heterogeneity.
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Some of the regressors included in xit may in fact be endogenous which
would lead to inconsistent estimators.26 To circumvent this difficulty, we
specify an additional equation for each of the endogenous regressors and
use Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) to estimate the system.27
More specifically, FIML is used to estimate the simultaneous system com-
posed of (1) and the equation
vit = ϑ+ w
′
itγ + z
′
itδ + ηit (2)
where vit is a component of the vector vit of (continuous) endogenous regres-
sors in xit, ϑ is a scalar parameter, wit is a vector of exogenous regressors in
xit, γ is the associated vector of parameters, zit is a vector of instruments, δ
is the associated vector of parameters, and ηit is a disturbance term.
For the regressions in which the reform dependent variable is continuous,
we fit the data by using the SYS-GMMmethod for dynamic panels as applied
to TSCS data.28 However, with a non stationary dependent variable, the
dispersion of the value of the coefficient in an autoregressive process of order
one found with different asymptotically equivalent methods is known to often
exceed its standard errors. Hence, we first investigate the stationarity of our
dependent variables. We find that these variables are stationary in first
differences and hence continue our analysis with these series transformed in
first differences.29
In the case of a continuous reform dependent variable, we then specify
the following dynamic autoregressive model:
yit = α0 + α1yit−1 + x′itβ + µi + ²it (3)
where i = 1, 2, . . . , N , t = 1, 2, . . . , T , yit is a one-dimensional variable rep-
26Endogeneity might stem from say competition having an effect on how corrupt the
government is (see Bliss and Di Tella, 1997, and Laffont and N’Guessan, 1999) or the
creation of a separate regulator affecting the level of network expansion and the size of
the telecommunications staff.
27Although FIML can be used to perform an exogeneity test, it becomes computation-
ally unfeasible as the number of regressors included as endogenous grows. We use then the
Two Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood (2SCML) estimator derived by Rivers and
Vuong (1988) to perform exogeneity tests since it allows the presence of multiple poten-
tially endogenous regressors. For more on 2SCML exogeneity tests, see the supplemental
document available from the authors.
28The dynamic nature of our data has been confirmed by Lagrange multiplier tests.
29Details on the stationarity tests can be found in Gasmi et al. (2006) and the results
obtained for this paper are available from the authors upon request.
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resenting the continuous dependent variable (fixed-line deployment or priva-
tization level), α0 and α1 are scalar parameters, xit is a vector of regressors,
β is the associated vector of parameters, µi is a country-specific fixed factor,
and ²it is a disturbance term.
30 For the fixed-line deployment regression, the
vector of regressors xit includes the institutional and democracy indices, the
population density, and the % of the population that is rural. It also contains
the indicators of the telecommunications reforms. For the privatization re-
gression, this vector of regressors contains the two population variables and
the variables that are used to test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical
literature on the determinants of reforms.
In our context, endogeneity problems seem likely to arise in the estima-
tion of equation (3). One may argue, for example, that privatization might
be used to signal commitment towards policy reforms contributing to the
reduction of risk ratings. Moreover, it has been argued that privatization
of public utilities may open the door to more corruption (Martimort and
Straub, 2006). To find appropriate instruments we use a standard approach
that consists in taking lagged variables in levels as a set of potential in-
struments and selecting appropriate lag lengths by investigating whether the
disturbance term is serially uncorrelated.31
4.2 Causality
Table 2 below summarizes the results of the Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) causal-
ity testing procedure applied to the telecommunications reforms and fixed-
line deployment variables. More specifically, these tests allow us to conclude
on the existence of a causal relationship of a Granger type between the vari-
ables that represent competition in the analogue cellular segment, ac, com-
petition in the digital cellular segment, dc, competition in the fixed-line local
segment lc, the creation of a separate regulator, r, and privatization, p, on
the one hand, and the variable that proxies the fixed-line deployment, ml,
30The standard assumptions E(µi) = 0, E(²it) = 0, E(²itµi) = 0, and E(yi1²it) = 0 are
made. The fixed-line deployment series is transformed in logs to minimize heteroskedas-
ticity and influential outliers problems and the vector of regressors xit is taken in first
differences to eliminate any sources of unobserved fixed heterogeneity.
31For a detailed description of how this approach is implemented, see Gasmi et al.
(2006).
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on the other hand.32
Table 2
Causal relationships
ac dc lc r p
reform → fixed-line deployment Yes Yes No Yes Yes
fixed-line deployment → reform No Yes Yes Yes No
This table shows that the telecommunications reforms Granger-cause
fixed-line deployment except when using the variable of competition in the
fixed-line local segment as the reform variable. Examining the reverse causal-
ity, we find some evidence of one that runs from the fixed-line deploy-
ment variable to the telecommunications reforms variables although slightly
weaker. More specifically, the fixed-line deployment variable causes the vari-
able of competition in the digital cellular segment, the variable of competition
in the fixed-line local segment, and the variable that indicates the creation
of a separate regulator. However, we do not find any empirical evidence that
would suggest that the fixed-line deployment variable causes the variable of
competition in the analogue cellular segment and the variable of privatiza-
tion.
In addition to bringing some empirical evidence on the existence of causal
relationships between reforms and infrastructure deployment variables, these
Granger tests provide us with invaluable information on the dynamics of these
relationships when they are found to exist. In the end, these tests allow us
to select potential variables, and their precise lag structure, to be included as
regressors in the regressions that are used to model the relationship between
reforms and network deployment.33
4.3 Determinants of reforms: Testable hypotheses
The literature on the factors that influence the decision to reform the telecom-
munications sector by introducing competition has emphasized the role of
corruption of the political system and the cost of public funds. Emerson
32The estimations on which these Granger-causality tests are based are available from
the authors upon request.
33Following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), we use variables lagged one, two, and three
periods in the Granger causality tests.
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(2006) develops a model where rent seeking firms agree to pay bribes to
policy makers to limit market entry. One of the equilibria obtained is char-
acterized by low (high) levels of corruption combined with high (low) levels
of competition. Under the assumption that data reflect equilibrium sate, this
suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Countries with relatively high corruption will tend to introduce
less competition.
Following a normative approach, Auriol and Picard (2004) develop a
model where it is optimal to foster competition in infrastructure industries
when the cost of public funds is low. In our context, this argument translates
into the hypothesis that follows:
Hypothesis 2: Countries with a relatively high cost of public funds will tend
to introduce less competition.
Turning to the reform which involves the creation of an independent reg-
ulator, the literature has pointed to the role of government commitment,
return on investment, and the discount factor. Drawing on a framework de-
veloped for analyzing the decision to create independent central banks, Evans
et al. (2005) claim that in infrastructure industries government commitment
and regulatory independence are substitutes. Moreover, these authors argue
that regulatory independence becomes more necessary to alleviate under-
investment when the return on investment and the discount factor are high.34
These arguments translate into the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Countries with relatively low government commitment, large
returns on investment, and high discount factors will tend to create an inde-
pendent regulator.
Among the determinants of the privatization reform in infrastructure sec-
tors discussed in the literature, we have focused on the role of corruption of
34Evans et al. (2005) show how delegating pricing decisions to a sufficiently pro-industry
regulator, i.e., whose preferences differ from those of the government, can alleviate the
under-investment problem in the absence of regulatory commitment. In addition, if in-
vestment in a regulated sector is crucial for the development of a country, it becomes then
necessary to provide a mechanism to alleviate under-investment. These authors also find
evidence that when agents attach a high value to the future due, for example, to polit-
ical stability or low interest rates, the welfare enhancing properties of the independent
regulator become more evident.
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the political system and the cost of public funds. Laffont (2005) develops a
positive theory of privatization where, for sufficiently low levels of corruption,
as corruption increases the private gains of politicians from privatization are
larger than those obtained with a public firm and dominate the social costs
of privatization. However, for very large levels of corruption, it is necessary
to leave the control of the firm to private shareholders, and in these cir-
cumstances, the private gains of politicians cannot compensate for the rents
appropriated by private investors. An implication of this theory is then that
at low (high) levels, increasing levels of corruption should influence posi-
tively (negatively) the decision to privatize. In our context, this implication
translates into the hypothesis that follows:
Hypothesis 4: Countries with sufficiently small or high levels of corruption
will tend to privatize less.
Returning to the normative approach, Auriol and Picard (2004) find that
when the government does not fully capture the expected profit of the pri-
vatization transaction, privatization improves social welfare for intermediate
values of the cost of public funds, but state ownership is preferred for low
or high values. Since developing countries have typically medium to large
levels of the cost of public funds, the latter should negatively influence the
privatization decision.35 The implication then is that when public firms in
the infrastructure sectors are sold at a discount because of a high country
risk rating, a government in need for cash should keep the profitable ones.
We translate these arguments into the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Countries with a relatively high cost of public funds and a high
risk will tend to privatize less.
4.4 Determinants of reforms: Estimation
We now make use of regression analysis to investigate the determinants of
the telecommunications reforms. We first consider the econometric specifi-
cations with a discrete reform dependent variable which are used to model
the introduction of competition in the cellular (analogue and digital) and
35Using a normative approach, Warlters (2004) also finds that a decrease in the cost of
public funds may induce infrastructure privatization in developing countries.
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fixed-line (local) markets, and the creation of a separate regulator. These
models are estimated using CLOGLOG and FIML when exogeneity turns
out to be rejected. Then, we consider the specification with a continuous
reform dependent variable which is used to model privatization. This model
is estimated using SYS-GMM and possible endogeneity of some regressors is
accounted for. In both types of specifications, the main regressors are drawn
from the set of variables that have “passed” the causality tests discussed in
section 4.2 and so as to permit the testing of the hypotheses discussed in
section 4.3.
Determinants of competition (cell and fixed) and of decision to
create a regulatory authority
Tables A1 through A4 given in the appendix display the estimation results
obtained by applying the grouped duration (robust cluster) methodology to
the regressions with, respectively, the variable competition in the analogue
cellular segment (acit), competition in the digital cellular segment (dcit),
competition in the fixed-line local segment (lcit), and creation of a separate
regulator (rit) as the dependent variable.
36,37 When CLOGLOG is applied
(see the columns with the heading “CLOGLOG” in the tables), these tables
show the parameter estimates corresponding to the indicated explanatory
variables without and with temporal dummies, the value of the log of the
pseudo-likelihood, “Log-likelihood,” a likelihood ratio statistic for testing
the validity of the temporal dummies, “Temporal dummies LR,” and the
number of observations actually used in the estimation, “Obs.”38
In the cases where endogeneity problems arise, FIML, more specifically
2SCML, is applied. We indicate the instruments that have been excluded in
the first-stage, “Instruments,” the squared partial correlation coefficient be-
tween the excluded instruments and the endogenous variable, “Partial R2,”
the value of the F statistic for testing the joint significance of the instruments
36Note that the independent variables are in first differences.
37A modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity under the null of homoskedas-
ticity rejects at the 1% significance level in all the regressions presented in Tables A1-A4.
Hence, standard errors are adjusted for intragroup correlation. The mean variance infla-
tor factor is also calculated in all the regressions and the values obtained always remain
smaller than 3.
38In all the tables presented in this paper, we indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% confidence level by the subscripts, ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ respectively.
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excluded in the first stage regression, “F,” the Sargan statistic for testing the
validity of the excluded instruments, “Sargan,” the squared correlation coeffi-
cient between observed and fitted first-stage values of the dependent variable,
“R2OLS,” the estimated correlation coefficient between the disturbances of the
first and second stage regressions (ωit and ηit from equations (1) and (2))
that signals whether the tested variable is endogenous, “Rho,” and the value
of the subsequent exogeneity test statistic, “Exogeneity.”39
Let us first examine the CLOGLOG estimation results of the models
without and with temporal dummies exhibited in Tables A1-A4. Comparing
these two types of models, we see from the values of the Temporal dummies
LR statistic that temporal independence is rejected in the models of com-
petition in the digital cellular segment and creation of a separate regulator.
This suggests that the time elapsed between a given reform and the previous
one or the beginning of the sample influences the outcome in the case of the
introduction of competition in the digital cellular segment and the creation of
a separate regulator, but not in the cases of the introduction of competition
in the analogue cellular and fixed-line local segments.
Regarding the presence of multiple events in the series describing the
introduction of competition in the analogue and digital cellular segments
indicated by the variables counter ana and counter dig respectively, the fol-
lowing obtains. The regressor counter ana has a significant negative impact
on the variable competition in the analogue cellular segment (Table A1).40
However, the regressor counter dig does not have a significant impact on
the variable competition in the digital cellular segment once temporal de-
pendence is corrected for (Table A2, Model E). Hence, the number and fre-
quency of licenses previously granted in the analogue cellular segment has a
negative impact on the decision to grant a license, that is, the second and
39A value of F over 10 is typically sufficient for identification in the presence of one
endogenous regressor. An R2OLS over 10% is also required for identification. As to the
Sargan test, we have adapted it to these discrete regressions. The validity of instruments
is checked wit a a Wald test.
40Given the history of the introduction of cellular technology (analogue followed by
digital), incorporating cellular competition in digital, dc, as a regressor for cellular com-
petition in analog creates an endogeneity problem that adds substantial complexity to
the estimation of this discrete model. Nevertheless, the counter variable, which has been
found to have a significant negative effect (see Table A1), gives a reasonable indication of
the role that digital has played in the evolution of the cellular market.
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subsequent licenses are not issued independently of the first one.41 In con-
trast, the structuration of previous licenses does not appear as having an
effect on the decision to grant a license in the digital cellular segment.
Given that some explanatory variables in these regressions with a discrete
reform dependent variable may potentially be endogenous, we perform exo-
geneity tests by applying the 2SCML (cluster-robust) technique to the best
of the two models, the one without temporal dummies and the one with.42
In fact, the best model is the one without dummies if temporal dependence
is rejected and the one with temporal dummies if it isn’t. From Tables A1-
A4, we see that the final modeling choices for the dependent variables are
Model A for ac and Model H for lc, both of these models without temporal
dependence, and Model E for dc and Model L for r, both with temporal
dependence.
Exogeneity is rejected in three cases.43 The fixed-line deployment variable
(∆ log(mlit−1)) is endogenous to the variable of competition in the digital
cellular segment according to both the individual test at the 10% level and
the joint test at the 5% level. The corruption variable (∆corruptionit) is
endogenous to the variable of competition in the fixed-line local segment
when tested both separately at the 10% level and jointly at the 1% level.
Finally, in Table S5, the institutional index (∆institutionalit) is endogenous
to the decision of creating a separate regulator when test both separately at
the 10% level and jointly at the 5% level.44
41This is consistent with the fact that during the period under study many countries
maintained a monopoly in the analogue cellular segment with the unique license often
owned by the fixed-line incumbent.
42Tables S2-S5 given in the supplemental document to this paper report the results of
these exogeneity tests performed on each of the potentially endogenous variables separately
and then jointly. In addition to containing some items already described for Tables A1-A4
in the appendix, these tables include a Shea’s square partial correlation that takes into
account the inter-correlation among instruments when more than one variable is being
tested at a time, “Shea’s partial R2.” Note that the Shea’s Partial R2 is more informative
than the Partial R2 in the presence of multiple potentially endogenous regressors. In such
a context, a large partial R2 and a small Shea’s partial R2 are interpreted as indicating
that the model is not identified.
43The Sargan statistic confirms the validity of instruments. In addition, there is no
problem of identification as is shown by an F statistic always superior to 10 in at least
one of the proposed testing configurations (separate or joint testing of the endogenous
regressors). The Shea Partial R2 is severely downsized as compared to the Partial R2
only in the joint exogeneity test performed in Table S5 of the supplemental document.
Nevertheless, this joint test is consistent with the results of the individual tests shown in
the same table.
44These results can be seen from Tables S3-S4 of the supplemental document.
22
For these cases where exogeneity is rejected, the FIML estimation results
are also reported in Tables A2-A4 and kept for the subsequent regressions
in which alternative explanatory variables are added.45 We observe that the
correlation coefficient Rho and the Exogeneity statistic found with FIML
confirm the 2SCML results rejecting the exogeneity of the instrumented vari-
ables.46 In the regressions corresponding to the variable of competition in
the digital cellular segment (Table A2), we see that the variable of fixed-line
deployment (∆mlit−1) becomes significant at the 1% level once instrumented
in Models F and G.47 In the regressions of the variable competition in the
fixed local segment (Table A3), the variable of corruption (∆corruptionit)
changes from a positive and significant effect in Model H to a negative and
significant effect once this variable is instrumented in Model J.48 Finally, in
the regressions that model the decision to create a separate regulator (Table
A4), the institutional index (∆institutionalit) changes from having a non
significant effect in Model L to a positive and significant effect at the 5%
level once this variable is instrumented in Model M.49
We now turn to the empirical evidence concerning the hypotheses on the
determinants of reforms discussed in section 4.3. Hypothesis 1 regarding the
role of corruption is only partially confirmed by our estimation results. We
do find some empirical support to it since the variable corruption is incorpo-
rated in the institutional index (∆institutionalit) and the latter, as can be
seen from Table A1, has a positive and significant impact on the decision to
introduce competition in the analogue cellular segment (Models A and C).50
45The CLOGLOG model is kept only in the case of competition in the analogue cellu-
lar segment where we didn’t find evidence of endogeneity. The reported estimates with
CLOGLOG and FIML cannot be directly compared as they are subject to different scaling.
46The R2OLS signals sufficient identification with values superior or close to 10%. The
negative correlation in Rho in Tables A2 and A4 signals the downward bias in the en-
dogenous variable, which can be seen by comparing Models E and F, and L and M,
respectively. Similarly, the positive correlation in Rho in Table A3 signals an upward bias
in the endogenous variable (see Models I and J).
47A “hat” above a variable indicates that this variable has been instrumented.
48The level of democracy (∆democracyit) and the total debt service (∆debtit−2) loose
their significance in Model J and the population density (∆densityit) becomes significant
at the 5% level.
49The checks and balances variable (∆checksit) looses significance in Model M and the
mainline penetration (∆mlit−2) and population density (∆densityit) variables become
significant at respectively the 10% and 5% levels.
50Recall that increasing values of the variable corruption indicate lower corruption in the
government and that, given the way the variable institutional is constructed (see section
3), lower corruption reflects a better institutional environment.
23
However, in Tables A2 and A3 explaining the decisions to introduce competi-
tion in the digital cellular and the fixed-line segments respectively, the insti-
tutional index, the corruption variable (∆corruptionit), and the democracy
variable (∆democracyit) all have a negative and significant impact (Models
F, G, and J).
What about the role of the cost of public funds in the decision to intro-
duce competition? Hypothesis 2 says that a higher cost of public funds should
discourage the introduction of competition. Our empirical analysis although
supportive of this hypothesis are somewhat mitigated. The results concern-
ing the decision to introduce competition in the analogue cellular and fixed
segments support this hypothesis. Indeed, from Table A1 we see that aid per
capita (∆aidit−2 in Models A and B) and net taxes on products (∆taxit−3
in Model C) have a positive and significant impact on competition.51 More-
over, from Table A3 we see that net taxes on products (∆taxit−2 in Model J)
has also a positive and significant impact on the decision to introduce com-
petition in the fixed-line local segment. In contrast, the results concerning
the decision to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment contra-
dict Hypothesis 2. We indeed see from Table A2 that the total debt service
(∆debtit−2 in Model F) has a positive and significant impact on this deci-
sion and aid per capita (∆aidit−3 in Model G) has a negative and significant
impact.
Let us now examine the empirical evidence on the role of government
commitment, the discount factor, and the returns on investment in the deci-
sion to create a separate regulator. Hypothesis 3 states that countries where
government commitment is weak, returns on investment are large, and the
discount factor is high are likely to establish a separate regulatory author-
ity.52 Our results do not seem to confirm the whole claim of this hypothesis.
First, assuming that government commitment is reasonably well captured in
the institutional index, we see from Model M in Table A4 that it has rather
a positive and significant impact on the decision to create a separate regu-
51Recall that the trust is that there exists a positive (negative) relationship between the
cost of public funds and the total debt service (net taxes and aid per capita). In practice,
we use these related variables lagged two and three periods and report the coefficients of
these lagged variables that are actually significant.
52We should emphasize here that the discussion of Hypothesis 3 in section 4.3 has
abstracted away from the debate of independence vs. autonomy of the regulator, although
the issue has its own importance.
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lator (Model M). Second, assuming that the discount factor is reflected in
the variable checks and balances (∆checksit), we see from this same table
that it is not significant once endogeneity problems have been alleviated in
Model M. Finally, assuming that the return on investment is well proxied
by the variable deployment of fixed lines (∆mlit−2), we see from the same
model M that it has a positive and significant effect on the decision to create
a separate regulator, a result that supports the third part of Hypothesis 3.
Determinants of privatization
Table A5 in the appendix presents the SYS-GMM (one-step robust) esti-
mation results of the regressions with the variable privatization as the de-
pendent variable and the coefficient shown corresponding to regressors in
first-differences. This table also exhibits the first and n-th order autocorre-
lation coefficients of the residuals in first differences, m1 and mn, the value
of the J statistic for testing the validity of the instruments, the value of the
Dif-Sargan statistic that allows to test the validity of the additional SYS-
GMM conditions, the value of the starting lag of the instruments, L, a Wald
statistic for testing the joint significance of the temporal dummies, Temporal
dummies, the F statistic for testing the joint significance of the explanatory
variables, Goodness-of-fit, and the number of observations actually used.
From this table, it appears that in all the estimations but that of Model
P, second-order autocorrelation of the residuals in first differences (m2) is
rejected using as instruments the initial lag of two and more periods for the
variables in levels and one period for the variable in first differences. This
confirms the validity of these instruments. In the case of Model P, we find
empirical evidence that the disturbance term in levels follows a MA(2). The
valid instruments then are the variables in levels lagged 4 and more periods
for the equation in first differences and the variables in differences lagged
3 periods for the equation in levels. Moreover, the J test never rejects the
validity of the instruments. We also see that the Dif-Sargan test accepts the
additional moment conditions required to use the SYS-GMM.
Time specific effects and endogeneity of regressors deserve some attention
here.53 The presence of time specific effects is tested and rejected in the
53That endogeneity is a relevant issue in our context has been already discussed. As to
time specific effects, their investigation is justified by the occurrence of some important
25
regression explaining privatization. Hence, time dummies are not included
in this regression.54 Endogeneity of regressors is checked using the goodness-
of-fit criterion. In the privatization regression, only the best model (with no
endogenous regressors, except for ∆pit−1) is reported in Table A5.
What are the implications of our empirical results as to the validity of
Hypothesis 4 which says that countries with little or extreme corruption in
the government should privatize less? We find that when corruption is prox-
ied by the democracy index, it has a negative impact on the privatization
decision in Model N, which is not consistent with the hypothesis. Interest-
ingly enough though, thinking of Hypothesis 4 as saying that corruption has
a decreasing marginal impact on privatization, we see that it is confirmed.
Indeed, from Table A5, we see that the institutional index which, recall, in-
corporates the corruption level, has a positive impact on the privatization
decision and the square of this index has a negative impact in Models Q and
R.
Regarding the hypotheses on the determinants of privatization, Hypoth-
esis 5 says that high costs of public funds and high risks are associated with
low privatization. This hypothesis is partially confirmed by our empirical
results. The current increase rate of the risk index (∆riskit) has a significant
impact on the privatization decision across all Models in Table A5, which
is consistent with the hypothesis.55 However, the cost of public funds has a
positive impact on the decision of privatizing, which is not consistent with
the hypothesis. We find that, in growth rates, the lagged (two and three
periods) total debt service (∆debtit−2, ∆debtit−3) has a positive impact on
privatization in Models N, O, and P, the lagged (two and three periods) aid
per capita (∆aidit−2 and ∆aidit−3) has a negative impact in Models N, O,
and P, and the lagged (two periods) net taxes on products (∆taxit−2) has a
negative impact in Model Q.
events during the period under study including the 1995 “Tequila” crisis, the 1997 South-
Asian crisis, the 1998-1999 financial breakdown, and the introduction of digital systems.
54As can be seen from Table A5, the variable Temporal dummies is not significant in
Model O and the Goodness-of-fit test rejects the presence of time specific effects.
55Recall that higher values of the risk index (risk) correspond to lower risk.
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4.5 Reforms-network expansion simultaneous relation-
ship
In this section, we discuss the implications of our results as far as the simul-
taneous relationship between the introduction of telecommunications reforms
and the deployment of the fixed-line network is concerned. We first put to-
gether the empirical elements that will allow us to construct this relationship.
Starting with the impact of the development of fixed service on the deci-
sion to reform, we have included the variable fixed-line deployment to explain
the decisions to introduce competition in the fixed line local and digital cellu-
lar segments, and to create a separate regulator. The specific effects obtained
are as follows. The growth of the lagged (one period) fixed service penetra-
tion rate (∆mlit−1) affects positively the decision to introduce competition
in the digital cellular segment (Table A2, Models F and G) and in the fixed
local segment (Table A3, Models H and J). As to the decision to create a sep-
arate regulator, it is found (Table A4, Model M) to be negatively affected by
the growth of lagged (two periods) fixed service penetration rate (∆mlit−2).
Let us now consider the impact of the reforms on fixed service penetration.
Table A6 in the appendix displays the results of the regression to look at.
This table has the same structure as Table A5 presented in the previous
section and, as a general rule, we have made the choice of regressors on
the basis of the results of the causality tests discussed in section 4.2.56 We
observe that all the reforms variables have been included as regressors except
the one used to represent the introduction of competition in the fixed-line
local segment.57 We find that competition in the analogue cellular segment
(∆acit−1) has a negative impact on the fixed-line deployment in Models S, T,
and U whereas competition in the digital cellular segment (∆dcit−1, ∆dcit−2)
has a positive impact in Model S and even when endogeneity is controlled
for in Model U (∆dcit−2). As to the other reform variables, we see that while
the creation of a separate regulator (∆rit−2) has a positive impact in Model
56In this table, we report the best model (with the endogenous regressors) in Model
U, and, for the purpose of making comparisons, the second best (with no endogenous
regressors) in Model S. In particular, Model S includes as endogenous the regressors when
a two-way causal relationship is found, that is, the variables competition in the digital
cellular segment and creation of a separate regulator.
57The lack of causality between the introduction of competition and the deployment of
service in the fixed service segment is not surprising as it is well known that this market
has experiencing heavy business stealing.
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S, once endogeneity is accounted for in Model U, the associated coefficient
is no longer significant. Finally, privatization (∆privait−1, ∆privait−2) has
a positive effect on the fixed service segment in Model S and this impact
remains significant (∆privait−1) when endogeneity of some regressors is taken
into account in Model U.
The results discussed so far indicate that there exists a simultaneous
relationship between the decision to introduce competition in the digital cel-
lular segment and the development of the fixed-line segment. More precisely,
higher penetration rates in the fixed segment have been an important de-
terminant of the decision to introduce competition in the digital cellular
segment and, in turn, competition in this sector has resulted in higher pene-
tration rates. Table 3 below summarizes the quantitative relationships found
between the various reform policies considered in this paper and fixed-line
deployment.58 In addition to showing the simultaneous relationship between
digital cellular competition and fixed service deployment, this table includes
the results on the other relationships considered that are worth discussing.
If we examine the role played by fixed-line deployment in the reform
decision-making process, we find evidence that the lower the fixed-line pene-
tration rate, the more likely a separate regulator will be created and the less
competition is introduced in the digital cellular and fixed local segments. A
possible explanation of these results is that poorly performing fixed service
sectors have called for the creation of a separate regulator to bring reme-
dies while well performing fixed sectors have resulted in the introduction of
competition in the digital cellular and fixed segments since those entail high
license fees. Let us now turn to an examination of the impact of the reforms
on the deployment of fixed infrastructure.
Consider first the results concerning the role of competition. As discussed
in the beginning of this section, we have found a positive impact of the in-
troduction of competition in the digital cellular segment on fixed network
expansion. In contrast, we have found that the introduction of competition
in the analogue cellular segment has a negative impact.59 These results de-
mand two remarks. First, the mere fact that we found opposite effects of the
58Table 3 is basically Table 2 where the causal relationships found are given the quan-
titative form resulting from the regression analysis.
59As mentioned earlier, competition in the fixed local segment has not been found to
have a significant impact on network expansion.
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two cellular technologies on network expansion justifies ex post our choice of
treating them separately. Indeed, the usual practice is to unify these two
segments by using an aggregate index of competition in the cellular sector
and the empirical findings have been almost systematically a positive impact
on the fixed sector.60 Second, these results suggest that, when it comes to
network expansion, digital cellular service and fixed service are complements
while analogue cellular service and fixed service are substitutes. Thinking of
competition as fostering service usage, this implication is consistent with the
fact that analogue licenses have been introduced before digital licenses and
have been mostly granted to the incumbent, in which case no strong com-
petition between fixed service and analogue cellular service can be expected.
Moreover, capacity constraints associated with the analogue technology have
typically limited the number of issued licenses in the analogue cellular seg-
ment.
What about the two other important reform policies, namely, privatiza-
tion and the creation of a separate regulator? Our work sheds some light on
the issue of the impact of privatization which is not settled in the literature.
We find evidence in our data set that privatization has a strong positive im-
pact on the fixed service penetration rate. As to the creation of a separate
regulator, the data does not seem to show that it has a significant impact on
fixed-line deployment.
Table 3
Summary of results: Relationship
between reforms and fixed-line deployment
ac dc lc r p
reform → fixed-line deployment - + na ns +
fixed-line deployment → reform na + + - na
Note: na and ns stand for not applicable and not significant, res-
pectively.
4.6 Institutional and economic environment determi-
nants of reform policies: Summary
To conclude the discussion of the empirical analysis, we summarize in Table
4 the results on the determinants of the telecommunications reform policies.
60See section 2.
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We can see from this table that the initial performance of the sector, the
institutional environment, and the cost of public funds play an important role
in the decisions to reform the industry. Let us say a few words about each
of the three main reforms, namely, competition, privatization, and creation
of a separate regulator, in turn.
Table 4
Summary of results: Determinants of reforms
ac dc lc r p
risk index
risk na na na na +
cost of public funds
total debt service ns + ns na +
net taxes on products + ns + na -
aid per capita + - ns na -
aggregated - + - na +
institutional environment indices
corruption ns ns - ns ns
institutional index + - ns + -
democracy index ns - ns ns +
institutional index (square) na na na na +
democracy index (square) na na na na ns
discount factor
checks and balances na na na ns na
returns on investment
fixed-line deployment na + + - na
Note: na and ns stand for not applicable and not significant respectively.
We have already mentioned the positive impact of fixed service pene-
tration rates on the decision to introduce competition in both the digital
cellular and fixed local markets. But, besides fixed service penetration rates
what else has a significant impact on the introduction of competition in the
telecommunications industry? We find that that the weaker the institutional
environment, the less likely to find competition in the analogue cellular mar-
ket and the more likely to find competition in the digital cellular and fixed
local markets. The decision to introduce competition is also found to be
markedly influenced by a country’s financial situation. Our analysis has
shown that the higher the cost of public funds, the more likely to find com-
petition in the digital cellular market and the less likely to find competition
in the analogue cellular and fixed service markets.
As to the privatization of the fixed service incumbent, we find that the
likelihood that it takes place is positively affected by a deterioration of the
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institutional environment and a higher cost of public funds, and negatively
by a higher country risk. A justification of these results is that in a country
with high risk, the government anticipates that the incumbent will be sold
at a discounted price and thus refrains from privatizing. Finally, concerning
the decision to create a separate regulatory authority, we find that a well
performing fixed service sector (higher penetration rates) affects this decision
negatively whereas a better institutional environment affects it positively.
5 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated the importance of the institutional and macroe-
conomic features of developing countries for understanding the evolution of
their telecommunications industry over the past two decades. To show this
point, we have set an empirical strategy to identify the key determinants of
the three main policy initiatives that have been at the heart of the reforms
of the telecommunications industry, namely, competition, privatization, and
the (re)structuring of regulation. To give more robustness to our argument,
from both a technical (investigating causality endogeneity) and a policy (ac-
counting for the rational of the reforms) viewpoint, we have also investigated
the extent to which these policies have translated into actual deployment of
telecommunications infrastructure.
Our econometric analysis of a 1985-1999 database on 86 developing coun-
tries in the form of a time-series-cross-section database indeed suggests that
sectoral but also institutional and financial factors are important determi-
nants of the actual reforms implemented in these countries. For technologi-
cal, historical, and jurisdictional reasons concerning the analogue and digital
segments of the cellular market, we departed from the standard approach
by treating separately these two segments. The separate treatment of these
two segments allowed us to obtain more disaggregated results than those
obtained in the literature as most of the studies have typically merged them.
Many factors warrant such a separate treatment. Capacity constraints
associated with the analogue technology are among the major reasons why
digital technology is relatively more appealing for the rapidly increasing cel-
lular market. Indeed, digital technology allows to allocate more users within
the same coverage area and more information can be simultaneously sent
31
and received by each phone user. Moreover, while analogue technology does
not allow for wireless data services, digital technology includes voice mail,
caller identification, call waiting, access to internet, and short message system
(SMS). In addition, digital technology is less prone than analogue technol-
ogy to interference and has better attributes related to privacy and security.
A drawback of the digital technology, however, is that, unlike the analogue
technology, there is currently no unified system and roaming between systems
can be expensive.
We have uncovered a positive relationship between the decision to in-
troduce competition in the digital cellular segment and the growth of the
fixed-line segment, whereas a negative relationship has been found between
the decision to introduce competition in the analogue cellular segment and
the growth of the fixed-line segment. These results reveal that the positive
effect of competition in the cellular market on the fixed service market re-
ported in the literature might in fact mainly reflect the impact of competition
in the digital cellular segment. Analogue cellular appears therefore as a sub-
stitute to the fixed service whereas digital cellular appears as a complement.
The analysis has indeed shown that the digital cellular and fixed markets
have benefited from each other.
As to the institutional and country risk effects, we find that countries
facing increasing institutional risk and financial constraints are more likely
to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment and to privatize the
fixed-line incumbent. In turn, these policies are those that were found to
enhance the deployment of fixed-line infrastructure.61 In contrast, competi-
tion in the analogue cellular segment and the creation of a separate regulator
are found to be less likely to be introduced in countries facing increasing
institutional risk and budget constraints. Their impact on fixed network
deployment is found to be negative or non significant.
How should one interpret our results that highlight the importance of the
quality of the institutional environment and the state of the government’s
61We should note that our result on the positive impact of privatization on fixed-line
deployment is in contrast with the null or negative impact found in the literature. This
might be due to the fact that most empirical studies have aggregated data on countries
with different levels of development. Separating data according to GDP, Gasmi et al
(2006) find a positive impact in data on developing countries and a negative impact in
data on developed countries.
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finances in the determination of the implemented reforms? Developing coun-
tries with higher institutional risk and tighter financial constraints are more
likely to promote policies, such as allowing entry into the digital cellular
segment and privatizing the fixed-line incumbent, that attract a larger num-
ber of investors whose rents can be extracted through the license fees, red
tape, or else.62 By the same token, these countries are less supportive of
those reforms that are likely to provide them with less cash, such as cellular
competition in the analogue segment and the creation of a regulator. Ex-
cept in extreme cases of high corruption, the economically profitable reforms
promoted by the governments are those that are likely to be successful, in
particular, those that are expected to have a significant positive impact on
the telecommunications infrastructure.63 This argument may partly explain
the impressive growth of telecommunications in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent
years.
62One can take the view that governments promote these reforms in order to circum-
vent institutional and economic country weaknesses. Nevertheless, this would imply that
governments can anticipate which policies will deliver better outcomes in terms of service
deployment.
63In this paper, we have discussed the positive impact of competition in the digital
cellular segment and privatization on fixed-line deployment, but we did find evidence of
a (standard) positive impact on cellular subscription as well and the results are available
from the authors upon request.
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Appendix
Table A1
Cellular (analogue) competition parameter estimates
Model A Model B Model C
cloglog cloglog cloglog
acit w/dummies
∆institutionalit 0.168∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
∆democracyit 0.182 0.122 0.174
∆debtit−2 -0.011 -0.010
∆taxit−2 0.063 0.047
∆aidit−2 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
∆debtit−3 0.003
∆taxit−3 0.113∗∗
∆aidit−3 0.001
∆ruralit 0.321 0.345 0.324
∆densityit -0.026 -0.023 -0.021
counter anait -0.435∗∗ -0.671∗∗ -0.520∗∗
Log-likelihood -176.86 -169.64 -167.85
Temporal dummies LR 16.43
Obs 643 643 586
Table A2
Cellular (digital) competition parameter estimates
Model D Model E Model F Model G
cloglog cloglog fiml fiml
dcit w/dummies w/dummies w/dummies
∆institutionalit -0.292∗∗∗ -0.323∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
∆democracyit -0.240∗∗ -0.115 -0.131∗ -0.054
∆debtit−2 0.048∗∗∗ 0.033* 0.026∗∗
∆taxit−2 -0.017 -0.034 -0.011
∆aidit−2 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001
∆debtit−3 0.005
∆taxit−3 -0.013
∆aidit−3 -0.007∗
∆ruralit -0.087 -0.284 -0.316∗ -0.286
∆densityit 0.040∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.021 0.031∗
∆mlit−1 0.682 0.187
∆̂mlit−1 2.846∗∗∗ 2.643∗∗∗
counter digit 0.369∗∗ 0.105 -0.233 -0.398
Log-likelihood -207.39 -183.38 -87.73 -92.58
Temporal dummies LR 48.02∗∗∗
Instruments ethnicit polconit school80i polconit
Partial R2 0.098 0.075
F 16.62 9.19
Sargan 0.00 0.03
R2OLS 0.199 0.155
Rho -0.684 -0.573
Exogeneity 11.77∗∗∗ 6.44∗∗
Obs 667 667 664 466
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Table A3
Fixed-line (local) competition parameter estimates
Model H Model I Model J
cloglog cloglog fiml
lcit w/dummies
∆corruptionit 1.510∗∗∗ 1.641∗∗∗
̂∆corruptionit -1.867∗∗
∆democracyit -0.266* -0.317∗∗ -0.055
∆debtit−2 0.043∗∗∗ 0.029* 0.007
∆taxit−2 0.165∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.056∗
∆aidit−2 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
∆ruralit 0.245 0.255 0.121
∆densityit 0.076 0.079 0.054**
∆mlit−1 11.821∗∗∗ 10.194∗∗∗ 4.882∗∗∗
Log-likelihood -63.29 -59.55 -41.80
Temporal dummies LR 7.47
Instruments ∆ruleit africai
Partial R2 0.064
F 14.69
Sargan 1.11
R2OLS 0.095
Rho 0.642
Exogeneity 8.75∗∗∗
Obs 667 667 667
Table A4
Separate regulator parameter estimates
Model K Model L Model M
cloglog cloglog fiml
rit w/dummies w/dummies
∆institutionalit -0.106 -0.131
̂∆institutionalit 0.296∗∗
∆democracyit -0.256 -0.227 -0.061
∆checksit 0.221∗ 0.181∗ 0.048
∆importit 0.059∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
∆staffit -1.890∗ -3.047∗ 0.762
∆ruralit 0.202 0.365 0.083
∆densityit -0.047 -0.077 -0.063∗∗
∆mlit−2 -1.835 -3.615 -2.197∗
Log-likelihood -130.68 -106.31 -1485.61
Temporal dummies LR 47.94∗∗∗
Instruments protest80i africai
Partial R2 0.032
F 12.50
Sargan 1.32
R2OLS 0.126
Rho -0.657
Exogeneity 4.24∗∗
Obs 688 633 688
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Table A5
Privatization parameter estimates
Model N Model O Model P Model Q Model R
sys-gmm sys-gmm sys-gmm sys-gmm sys-gmm
∆pit w/dummies
∆̂pit−1 0.018 0.006 0.113 0.022 0.014
∆riskit 0.010∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.004∗∗
∆institutionalit -0.013∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
∆institutional2it 0.001
∗∗ 0.001∗
∆democracyit 0.188∗ 0.135 0.032
∆democracy2it -0.016 -0.013 -0.002
∆debtit−2 0.001∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.001
∆taxit−2 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003∗
∆aidit−2 -0.001∗∗ -0.001 -0.001∗∗
∆debtit−3 0.001∗∗ -0.000
∆taxit−3 0.001 0.003
∆aidit−3 -0.001∗ 0.000
∆ruralit 0.073 0.083 0.004 0.048 0.045
∆densityit -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
m1 -3.84∗∗∗ -3.82∗∗∗ -2.93∗∗∗ -3.52∗∗∗ -3.42∗∗∗
m2 0.59 0.03 1.08 1.09
m4 -1.73∗
J 5.54 7.85 2.59 10.18 9.15
Dif-Sargan 0.37 1.37 -0.99 0.60 3.82
L 2 2 4 2 2
Temporal dummies 1.38
Goodness-of-fit 6.88∗∗∗ 3.43∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗ 3.86∗∗∗ 5.71∗∗∗
Obs. 667 667 620 672 613
Note: The starting lag for the instruments is L and (L− 1) for the equation in first diffe-
rences and levels, respectively.
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Table A6
Fixed-line deployment parameter estimates
Model S Model T Model U
sys-gmm sys-gmm sys-gmm
∆log(mlit) w/dummies
̂∆log(mlit−1) 0.558∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗
∆pit−1 0.107∗∗ 0.104∗ 0.099∗
∆pit−2 0.067∗∗ 0.066∗ 0.068
∆acit−1 -0.016∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
∆dcit−1 0.031∗∗ 0.025
∆dcit−2 0.011∗∗ 0.007
∆̂dcit−1 0.001
∆̂dcit−2 0.019∗
∆rit−2 0.023* 0.024∗
∆̂rit−2 0.042
∆institutionalit 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.002∗∗
∆democracyit 0.007 0.010 0.004
∆ruralit -0.006 -0.012 -0.001
∆densityit -0.006 -0.006 -0.002
m1 -4.93∗∗∗ -4.88∗∗∗ -4.99∗∗∗
m2 0.40 0.50 0.76
J 55.04 46.88 57.88
Dif-Sargan -3.33 -2.63 -3.01
L 2 2 2
Temporal dummies 1.48
Goodness-of-fit 17.71∗∗∗ 17.43∗∗∗ 20.41∗∗∗
Obs. 775 775 775
Note: The starting lag for the instruments is L and (L− 1) for the
equation in first differences and levels, respectively.
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